多部门协作下危险品运输监管的演化博弈

doi:10.16265/j.cnki.issn 1003-3033.2020.10.010

中国安全科学学报 ›› 2020, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (10): 69-74.doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn 1003-3033.2020.10.010

多部门协作下危险品运输监管的演化博弈

王伟¹ 副教授, 王晓楠¹, 丁黎黎¹ 教授, 张文思¹, 张辉²

1 中国海洋大学经济学院,山东青岛 266100;
2 山东建筑大学交通工程学院,山东济南 250101

收稿日期:2020-07-30 修回日期:2020-09-07 出版日期:2020-10-28 发布日期:2021-07-15
作者简介:王伟 (1985—),男,湖北黄冈人,博士,副教授,主要从事危化品运输管理和应急管理方面的研究。E-mail:walker@ouc.edu.cn。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助(71701189;71973132);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助(18YJCZH247);山东省哲学社会科学规划项目(18DGLJ01)。

Research on evolutionary game of hazardous materials transportation and supervision based on multi-sectoral collaboration

WANG Wei¹, WANG Xiaonan¹, DING Lili¹, ZHANG Wensi¹, ZHANG Hui²

1 School of Economics, Ocean University of China, Qingdao Shandong 266100, China;
2 School of Transportation Engineering, Shandong Jianzhu University, Ji'nan Shandong 250101, China

Received:2020-07-30 Revised:2020-09-07 Online:2020-10-28 Published:2021-07-15

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为解决危险品运输企业违法运输及政府部门监管不力的问题,构建以危险品运输企业和2个监管部门为主体的三方演化博弈模型,分析三方共同作用的演化博弈均衡,利用演化仿真模拟多部门协作的监管效果,揭示违法运输罚款、监管成本以及监管成功率的变化对危险品运输企业和政府监管部门决策施加影响的过程。结果表明:多部门协作有助于提高监管部门对企业违法运输行为的查处率,有利于促进运输企业合法运输和监管部门严格监管;多部门协作有利于降低监管成本,提高监管部门的监管积极性;多部门协作有利于对违法运输行为进行合理罚款,但只有在查处成功率较高的情况下,罚款才能对企业违法运输行为起到抑制作用。

关键词: 多部门协作, 危险品运输企业, 演化博弈, 政府监管, 罚款

Abstract: In order to solve problems of illegal transportation of hazardous materials (hazmats) transportation enterprises and inadequate supervision of government departments, an evolutionary game model with a hazmats transportation enterprise and two regulation departments as subjects was established, and evolutionary game equilibrium of these three parties were analyzed. Then, regulatory effects of multi-sectoral collaboration were simulated by using evolutionary simulation. Finally, influence process of changes of illegal transportation fines, regulatory costs and regulatory success rates on decision of transportation enterprise and government authorities was revealed. The results show that multi-sectoral collaboration can help improve regulatory success rate of illegal transportation, promote legal operation in enterprises and close supervision by government authorities. It is conducive to reducing regulation costs and increase supervision enthusiasm of departments. Moreover, such collaboration is beneficial to impose reasonable fines for illegal transportation, but fines can only suppress such behaviors when regulation success rate is high.

Key words: multi-sectoral collaboration, hazmats transportation enterprise, evolutionary game, government regulation, fine

中图分类号:

X951

王伟, 王晓楠, 丁黎黎, 张文思, 张辉. 多部门协作下危险品运输监管的演化博弈[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2020, 30(10): 69-74.

WANG Wei, WANG Xiaonan, DING Lili, ZHANG Wensi, ZHANG Hui. Research on evolutionary game of hazardous materials transportation and supervision based on multi-sectoral collaboration[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2020, 30(10): 69-74.

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多部门协作下危险品运输监管的演化博弈

Research on evolutionary game of hazardous materials transportation and supervision based on multi-sectoral collaboration

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